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Abstract
Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform on identification schemes is one of the main ways of
constructing signature schemes. While the classical security of this transformation is well un-
derstood, it is only very recently that generic results for the quantum case have been proposed
[DFMS19, LZ19]. These results are asymptotic and therefore can’t be used to derive the concrete
security of these signature schemes without a significant loss in parameters.
In this paper, we show that if we start from a commit-and-open identification scheme, where
the prover first commits to several strings and then as a second message opens a subset of
them depending on the verifier’s message, then there is a tight quantum reduction for the the
Fiat-Shamir transform to special soundness notions. Our work applies to most 3 round schemes
of this form and can be used immediately to derive quantum concrete security of signature
schemes.
We apply our techniques to several identification schemes that lead to signature schemes such
as Stern’s identification scheme based on coding problems, the [KTX08] identification scheme
based on lattice problems, the [SSH11] identification schemes based on multivariate problems,
closely related to the NIST candidate MQDSS, and the PICNIC scheme based on multiparty
computing problems, which is also a NIST candidate.
1 Introduction
Each year brings new advances in quantum technologies [ABB+19] and we will soon need to de-
ploy post-quantum cryptography in order to prevent ourselves against the potential construction
of a quantum computer capable of running Shor’s algorithm [Sho94] and other powerful quantum
algorithms. The NIST standardization process of post-quantum cryptographic primitives [NIS17]
(specifically encryption schemes, key encapsulation mechanisms and signature schemes) is cur-
rently ongoing and it becomes crucial to continue to build trust for these schemes. A first way to
build trust is to constantly challenge the post-quantum computational assumptions by designing
new quantum algorithms. Another very important aspect is to make sure we have sound security
reductions even with quantum computers. In particular, several technical problems arise when
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translating the Random Oracle Model1 (ROM) to the Quantum ROM (QROM) and we need to
rewrite all the security proofs involving the QROM.
Quantum security reductions for signature schemes
In this paper, we focus on quantum security reductions for signature schemes. There are
mainly 2 families of signature schemes that use security reductions in the QROM: (1) Hash and
Sign signatures and (2) signatures using the Fiat-Shamir transform on identification schemes. We
understand well the security of Hash and Sign signatures in the QROM [Zha12]. For those using
the Fiat-Shamir transform, it is only recently that there exists a general proof of its security in the
QROM [DFMS19, LZ19].
So is this the end of the story? Not quite. The results of [DFMS19, LZ19] are only asymptotic
and are not tight. This means that if you want your signature scheme to have 128 bits of security,
you need to choose parameters such that your post-quantum computational assumption has 256, 384
or often much more bits of security. Several schemes have tight security reductions QROM, for
example those based on lossy identification schemes [KLS18] or closely related [ABB+19]. However,
several others have only non tight security reductions and some even don’t have a post-quantum
security reduction, including some NIST candidates2 Of course, designers that use a non-tight
security reduction could take this into account in their parameters but almost no one does this as
it would be devastating for their parameters. Instead, designers often have to fix parameters as
if the reductions were tight and accept not having concrete security claims. For example, in their
latest design specification, the authors of PICNIC write the following:
“One caveat we note is that this generalization comes with a cost in tightness of the reduction.
The reduction for the ZKB++ parameter sets looses a factor of q2, and for KKW the loss is a factor
q6, where q is the number of hash queries. As the results are non-tight, and depend on the asymp-
totic analysis of [DFMS19], we make no claims about the concrete security of Picnic in the QROM.”
In a similar vein, the authors of the MQDSS signature scheme [CHR+20] write in their latest
specifications:
“Another weakness of our security proof is that it is not at all tight. This is again an inherent
weakness introduced by the rewinding technique of the forking lemma. Therefore, in order to produce
a tight security reduction for MQDSS one would have to base the proof on different techniques. At
the moment, we are not aware of such techniques that we could use”
This lack of tightness can have real consequences. For example, there has been a recent attack
exploiting the non-tightness of the security reduction of the MQDSS signature scheme by Kales
and Zaverucha [KZ19]. This was fortunately easily fixable by increasing the parameters without
too much harm but this overall situation is unsettling for the trust we have in the parameter sets of
these schemes, which is especially problematic since the NIST will soon choose some post-quantum
signature schemes to standardize with some fixed parameters. There is therefore an urgent need to
find as tight security reductions as possible for signature schemes in the QROM.
Our work in a few words
1In the Random Oracle Model, we model a hash function by a truly random function to which we only have black
box access. This model is in all generality unrealistic and can be too strong in some corner case scenarios [CGH04]
but has been extremely useful for making efficient security reductions [KM15] and is passing well the test of time.
2The GeMSS signature scheme described in [CFM+20] doesn’t even have a full concrete security claims against
classical adversaries for instance.
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In this work, we show tight security reduction in the QROM for a large class of identification
schemes: namely 3-round commit-and-open identification schemes. We also derive a more precise
reduction when considering parallel repetition of commit-and-open identification schemes. We
apply our results to existing signature schemes and show their concrete security, while until now,
only asymptotic security was known. We consider Stern’s signature scheme [Ste93] 3, the 3 round
SSH signature scheme, which is a non-optimized version of the MQDSS signature the PICNIC
signature scheme and the scheme from [KTX08].
In order to find these tight reductions, we can’t use rewinding techniques as they introduce non-
tightness. Moreover, we have to be careful with quantum reprogramming techniques since these
can also add some non-tightness as we can see from the [DFMS19] results. So how do we proceed?
We first extend Unruh’s result and show the quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform for
identification schemes that have some notion of soundness between statistical and computational
soundness. Then, at a crucial moment of our proof, we need to replace a random permutation by
a pseudorandom permutation which is easily invertible. We use the recent result on the quantum
security of Feistel networks to construct this pseudorandom permutation. We present all steps and
proof techniques more in detail in Section 2. This work is quite different and complements well the
recent work [DFMS19, DFM20] as it is more suited for concrete quantum security claims useful for
designers of signature schemes but is less general.
Related work
We briefly presented a few security results in the QROM, let us present a more detailed presen-
tation of related work which will still be far from exhaustive. The QROM was first studied quite
late actually in [BDF+11] where it was correctly assessed that in the quantum setting, an adversary
making queries to a random oracle should have a quantum access to it, since the hash function it
models has a public description. There, they showed the security of some schemes in the QROM, as
well as examples where schemes were secure in the ROM but not in the QROM. Other impossibility
results showed settings where, in all generality, the quantum Fiat-Shamir transform is not secure
[DFG13, ARU14]. On the positive side, [DFG13] proved the security of the quantum Fiat-Shamir
transform when oblivious commitments are used. Unruh [Unr15] then showed that it was possible
to do a Fiat-Shamir like transform to remove the interaction from identification protocols. This
transform is however rather inefficient and was hardly used in practice. More recently, there have
been new positive results related to the quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform. If an
identification scheme is lossy, then [KLS18] showed tight concrete quantum security bounds for
the Fiat-Shamir transform. They used this result to prove the security of the Dilithium signature
[DKL+17], which is a NIST competitor. Another related result is the security proof of qTESLA
[ABB+19]. Unruh [Unr17] showed the quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform for identifi-
cation schemes with statistical security, or using a dual-mode hard instance generator, a property
closely related to the lossiness property. Another related work is the the framework of recording
quantum queries by Zhandry [Zha19] which is a very powerful tool for studying random functions
and the QROM4.
3This scheme actually already has concrete quantum security bounds because the underlying identification scheme
can be made lossy[Lei18]. However, this introduces some losses in the parameters that don’t arise with our techniques.
4In a previous iteration of this submission, we actually tried to use this framework but we had issues with the
proofs and we replaced this framework with the use of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations arising from
Feistel networks.
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Recently, 2 papers [DFMS19, LZ19] showed generic reduction for the quantum Fiat-Shamir
transform. Unlike what was believed before, they show that it is actually possible to perform
reprogramming of a quantum random oracle and to follow the classical proofs. Their results are
not tight and lose at least a factor of O(q2) where q is the number of queries to the random function.
The results of [LZ19] add even a larger factor of non-tightness but can be applied to more general
settings than those of [DFMS19]. Even more recently, another work [DFM20] showed that this
O(q2) loss is tight and showed a large of class of examples where this is necessary. We will discuss
this in the next section and show that this is less harmful than it seems for security reductions.
2 State of the art, overview of our results and proof techniques
We will focus on the quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform for identification schemes and
we will use known results in the QROM to transform this security into the quantum security for
resulting signature schemes.
State of the art for identification schemes
In an identification scheme IS, a prover P has a pair of public and secret key (pk, sk) and wants
to convince a verifier V (that sees only the public key pk) that he has a valid corresponding secret
key sk. In its most standard form, an identification scheme consists of 3 messages: a first message
x from P to V , a challenge c from V to P which is a random string and finally a response z from
P to V . V finally has a procedure that from (pk, x, c, z) determines whether he is convinced or
not. The Fiat-Shamir transform consists of replacing the above interaction with a single message
(x,H(x), z)5 from P to V where H is a hash function modeled as a truly random function in the
QROM.
An adversary, who knows only pk and no corresponding sk, breaks the Fiat-Shamir transform of
IS if he can construct a triplet (x,H(x), z) that the verifier will accept. Breaking the identification
scheme (in the sense of computational soundness) means that an adversary can construct a string
x and, when he receives a challenge c, he can construct a string z such that the verifier will accept
(pk, x, c, z).
The security of the quantum Fiat-Shamir transform means that we can polynomially relate the
above 2 probabilities. For example, the result in [DFMS19] can be stated as follows
QADVFSH[IS](t, qH) ≤ q
2
H ·QADVIS(O(t)). (1)
On the left side is the quantum probability (or advantage) of breaking the Fiat-Shamir transform of
an identification scheme IS with a quantum adversary running in time t and making qH quantum
queries to H. The right side corresponds to the probability of breaking IS for an adversary running
in time O(t). We can see already the term q2H accounting for the non-tightness of this reduction.
There is another source of non-tightness: we often require a bound in terms of the quantum
advantage for special soundness and not computational soundness. An adversary that breaks the 2-
special soundness property is able to construct 2 valid triplets (x, c, z) and (x, c′, z′) with c 6= c′6(the
first message x is the same for both triplets). This can be generalized to γ-special soundness where
5The message actually just consists of (x, z) since H(x) can be constructed from x.
6In the asymptotic case, 2-special soundness is often defined with an efficient extractor that takes a pair of triplets
and outputs a valid secret key. The current definition is similar in spirit and uses an advantage notion which is more
adapted for concrete security bounds.
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we require an adversary to create γ valid triplets (x, c1, z1), . . . , (x, cγ , zγ) where the challenges ci
are pairwise distinct. One can relate computational soundness advantage with γ-special soundness
advantage but this comes with another big loss in tightness. For example, the authors of [DFMS19]
use roughly7 the following bound:
QADVIS(t) ≤
[
QADV γ-spIS (O(t))
] 1
2γ−1 (2)
which, when combined to Equation 1, gives the bound
QADVFSH[IS](t, qH) ≤ q
2
H ·
[
QADV γ-spIS (O(t))
] 1
2γ−1 . (3)
We can see that already with γ = 2, we have a cubic loss in the exponent because we use special
soundness and we lose a power 5 when requiring 3-special soundness, which are the 2 most com-
mon cases. In conclusion, while these asymptotic results, as well as those in [LZ19], are extremely
important for having post-quantum trust in the Fiat-Shamir transform for identification schemes,
the amount of non-tightness is significantly too large to make concrete security claims with decent
parameters.
Overview of our results
Our results will remove this non-tightness for an important class of identification schemes,
namely commit-and-open identification schemes. In a commit-and-open identification scheme,
the prover can extract a string z = z1, . . . , zn from the secret key sk. His first message x =
G(z1), . . . , G(zn) consists of committing to all the values zi with a commitment function G and
then in the second message, he reveals a subset of the zi depending on the challenge c. Several
schemes, such as Stern’s identification scheme, the Picnic identification scheme and the SSH iden-
tification scheme that inspired the MQDSS signature are of this form. They are all even more
particular: they consist of a parallel repetition of a commit-and-open identification scheme IS
with challenge size 3 and the advantage of the underlying post-quantum computational assumption
is equal to QADV 3-spIS (t). Our first theorem deals specifically with the parallel repetition case.
Theorem 1 (Simplified). Let IS be a commit-and-open identification scheme that uses a commit-
ment G modeled as a random function. Let γ ≥ 2 be an integer. For any t, qH, qG, and number of
repetition r, we have
QADVFSH[IS⊗r ](t, qH, qG) ≤ QADV
γ-sp
IS (O(t)) +O
(
q2H(γ − 1)
r
|C|r
)
+O
(
q3G
|M |
)
where |C| is the size of the challenge space and |M | is the size of the space of each xi = G(zi).
Here, the left hand side is the probability (i.e. advantage) that a quantum adversary has of
breaking the Fiat-Shamir transform of IS⊗r, the r-fold parallel repetition of IS. The adversary is
running in time t and performs qH quantum queries to the hash function used in the Fiat-Shamir
transform and qG quantum queries to the commitment function G. We also use the QROM and
model G as a truly random function.
7The bound is actually slightly worst as Theorem 25 of [DFMS19] (in the eprint version) generalizes Lemma 7 of
[Unr12] while it should generalize Lemma 8 in order to account for the fact that the challenges have to be pairwise
distinct. The difference is however only minimal and doesn’t change the asymptotic behavior, even though it may
add some small dependence in the size of the challenge space.
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These terms on the right hand side are all necessary. The first term is supposed to be related
to the hardness of the computational problem. The term O
(
q2H(γ−1)
r
|C|r
)
corresponds to applying
Grover’s algorithm on the challenge space. This attack appears for example in schemes that have
3-special soundness but where an adversary can easily construct an x for which he can successfully
answer 2 of the 3 verifier’s challenges. This is also the attack that was presented in [DFM20]
with γ = 2. So indeed, the q2H might be necessary but only for the part of advantage related to
the challenge attack and crucially, the O(q2H) factor loss in [DFMS19] isn’t tight in front of the
advantage to break the computational problem. What we describe here is also true for the example
presented in [DFM20] so their tightness result of the O(q2) loss factor is much less harmful that
what it seems even for schemes where it holds. The third term is also necessary corresponds to
attacking the commitment function and breaking the binding property by finding collisions on G.
An interesting remark about this theorem is that designers already implicitly used results very
similar to Theorem 2 but without a formal proof and used it to determine the value of r8.
What we omitted in the description of Theorem 1 is that the O(t) hides some additive terms
that depend on |C| so they are well suited for parallel repetition of schemes with small challenge but
are not suited when these are exponential. To circumvent this, we also generalize the above theorem
when we don’t have parallel repetition but just a single identification scheme with potentially a
large challenge space. We prove the following
Theorem 2 (Simplified). Let γ ≥ 2 be an integer and let IS be a commit-and-open identification
scheme with a commitment function G modeled as a random function. We have for any running
time t and number of queries qH, qG
QADVFSH[IS](t, qH, qG) ≤ QADV
γ-osp
IS (O(t)) +O
(
q2Hγ
|C|
)
+O
(
q3G
|M |
)
.
Here, the O(·) terms do not depend on |C| anymore. This theorem is very similar to Theorem
1 but the reduction is to a weaker notion of special soundness, namely output special soundness
(hence the γ-osp in the theorem) that we will discuss more in detail in the paper. Informally,
we want again the adversary to produce γ valid triplets (x, ci, zi) except that he doesn’t need to
know what are the challenges ci that correspond to the zi. The identification schemes we study
all can use Theorem 1 but it would be interesting to see if some other schemes could use Theorem 2.
Finally, an important conceptual step of our results is to relate the quantum Fiat-Shamir
advantage for any identification scheme (so not necessarily commit and open) to the notion of
γ-rigid soundness. This notion can be seen as a computational-statistical notion of soundness
meaning that the adversary is computationally bounded when producing the first message x but
unbounded when producing the response z (that depends on pk, x, and the challenge c). Informally,
an adversary breaks the γ-rigid soundness property if he can construct x such that he will be able
to answer in a valid way at least γ different challenges (he is unbounded for this second message).
We prove the following
8For example, the PICNIC scheme is of the form IS⊗r and we have 3-special soundness for IS (so we pick γ = 3)
and |C| = 3. If we want 64 bits of quantum security (so qH = 2
64), we want from the challenge attack
q2
H
2r
3r
≤ 1
(omitting the O(·)) which implies r ≥ 219. If we want 128 bits of quantum security, this r has to be doubled. This
corresponds exactly to the number of repetitions of the PICNIC scheme respectively for levels 1 and 5 of the NIST
security levels.
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Proposition 1. For any integer γ ≥ 2, time t, number of queries qH, and identification scheme
IS, we have
QADVFSH[IS](t, qH) ≤ QADV
γ-rs
IS (t, qH) +O(
q2Hγ
|C|
).
This proposition can be seen as a generalization of Unruh’s reduction from the quantum advan-
tage of the Fiat-Shamir transform to statistical soundness. The fact that we impose a γ threshold
here in our rigid soundness definition makes it easier to related to γ-special soundness without any
losses in tightness. We use this proposition for commit-and-open identification schemes but it could
have more applications.
Techniques used
How to we achieve our results? The most common ways of proving the quantum security of
the Fiat-Shamir transform use techniques such as quantum rewinding or quantum reprogramming.
These techniques are very general but introduce some non-tightness that we want to avoid so we
have to manage without them. Our starting point is to use Unruh’s result on the quantum security
of the Fiat-Shamir transform when the underlying identification scheme has statistical soundness.
In this case, things are fairly easy and we can invoke quantum lower bounds on the search problem
to conclude. As we wrote above, we first introduce the notion of γ-rigid soundness to achieve
Proposition 1 that holds for any identification scheme.
We then look more precisely at commit-and-open identification schemes, where during the first
message, the prover commits to some values x = G(z1), . . . , G(zn) where G is the commitment
function and reveals a subset of those zi as his second message. We first show that we can replace
this function G with a random permutation σ 9. This comes from the fact that the actual values
of G(z1), . . . , G(zn) are used only for computing the challenge c = H(G(z1), . . . , G(zn)). Since H
is also random, we show that this change of G doesn’t change the quantum advantage, on average
on H.
However, because we want tight results, we are far from done. We can’t use generic relations
from computational soundness to γ-special soundness (like the one in Equation 2). We need to
directly reduce to γ-special soundness without going through computational soundness. To do so,
we need from the string σ(z1), . . . , σ(zn) to be able to recover the whole string z = z1, . . . , zn.
However, we only have black box access to σ and we don’t have access to a inversion oracle. The
idea we use to do this is to replace σ with a pseudorandom permutation pi0 which doesn’t change
the security claim but which is easily invertible. From there, we can tightly relate the Fiat-Shamir
advantage to a γ-special soundness advantage. How do we construct this function pi0? We use
recent results on the quantum security of Feistel networks from [HI19]. This result shows how
to construct quantum secure random permutations from random functions with black box access.
These Feistel networks also have the property that they are easily computable and invertible, even
when the underlying random function is hard for the preimage finding problem. We use as the
underlying pseudorandom function the SHAKE-256 function, which is quantum-secure [CHS19].
Putting this all together, we can relate the quantum Fiat-Shamir to special soundness notions.
In order to use the security of the Feistel networks, we have to artificially increase the size of
the input space of the commitment scheme and we also replaced the random function G with
the function pi0. So how we can conclude about special soundness for the original scheme. For
9We note here that this replacement is just part of a proof technique. We prove the security of identification
schemes for random commitment schemes which are not permutations.
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Theorem 2, this is immediate as our transformations do not change the γ-output special soundness
advantage. However, this is not true for γ-special soundness. For Theorem 1, we actually reduce to
a stronger variant of γ-special soundness which is also invariant under our transformations which
immediately implies Theorem 1.
We now dive in the more formal part of this paper.
3 Preliminaries
Basic notations. For an integer N ∈ N∗, we denote by [N ] the set {1, . . . , N}. For a (usually
probabilistic) algorithm A(·), x ← A(·) means that we run A(·) with some fresh randomness and
get some output x. We will sometimes also use the notation A(·)→ x.We will also use the notation
x← D when D is a distribution when we sample x from D. For a set S, the notation x
$
←− S means
that x is chosen uniformly at random from the set S. Let FXY be the set of functions from X to Y
and let PX be the set of permutations acting on X. The notation
△
= designs an equality which is
a definition.
3.1 Quantum query algorithms.
In this work, we will often work with query algorithms that have a black box access to some
deterministic function f . A classical access to f means that we can perform queries that on input
x outputs f(x). A quantum access to f means that we can perform the unitary Uf in a black box
manner, where
Uf : |x〉|y〉 → |x〉|y ⊕ f(x)〉.
A quantum query algorithm with classical access to f will be denoted A f and a quantum query
algorithm with quantum access to f will be denoted A |f〉. For any quantum algorithm A , we
denote by |A | it’s total running time. We write |A |f〉| = (t, qf ) when A
|f〉 runs in time t and
performs qf quantum queries to f. We can also write |A
|f〉| = (∗, qf ) to specify only the number of
queries but not the running time. Unless stated otherwise, black box calls to f or Uf are efficient
and we fix the running time of a query to be equal to 1.
In the notation A |f〉, the behavior of the query algorithm is described by A and the superscript
|f〉 only indicates which function is queried. This means that the algorithm A |g〉 behaves exactly
as A |f〉 where calls to Uf are replaced with calls to Ug. We can also write A for a quantum query
algorithm where the queried function is not specified.
A query algorithm can perform queries to different functions. For example A |f〉,|g〉,|h〉 has a
black box access to the 3 unitaries Uf , Ug, Uh. We write |A
|f〉,|g〉,|h〉| = (t, qf , qg, qh) to denote the
fact that A |f〉,|g〉,|h〉 runs in time t, performs qf queries to Uf , qg queries to Ug and qh queries to
Uh. Finally, we define the q-query quantum variational distance between 2 distributions D1,D2 on
functions as
∆q(D1,D2)
△
= max
A :|A |=(∗,q)
∣∣∣∣ Prf←D1[A |f〉(·) outputs 0]− Prg←D2[A |g〉(·) outputs 0]
∣∣∣∣ .
3.2 Hash functions and Feistel networks
SHAKE-256. In this work, we will need a quantum secure hash function. We use SHAKE-256
which is a SHA-3 variant [BDPV11] that uses the sponge construction with variable input and
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output sizes. We write SHAKE-256X,Y to explicit the input space X and output space Y . The
sponge construction is known to be quantum secure [CHS19] and it is standard in the QROM to
model SHAKE-256X,Y with a random function in F
X
Y for which we only have black box access.
Feistel networks. Feistel networks are a generic way to transform pseudorandom functions in
pseudorandom permutations. They were first studied by Luby and Rackoff [LR88], and we know
well their classical security. Recently, the quantum security was proven for 4 round Feistel networks.
Very briefly, the 4 round Feistel network starts with a function f ∈ F
{0,1}n
{0,1}n
and constructs a
permutation Fe4(f) ∈ P
{0,1}2n . Fe4(f) uses 4 black box calls to f and both Fe4(f) and Fe4(f)
−1
are efficiently computable if we know how to efficiently compute f (but not necessarily f−1). The
quantum security of Fe4 was recently proven in [HI19]:
Proposition 2 ([HI19]). Let D1 be the distribution sampled as follows: f
$
←− F
{0,1}n
{0,1}n , return Fe4(f).
We have ∆q(D1,P
{0,1}2n ) ≤ O(
√
q6
2n ).
3.3 The (quantum) random oracle model
Suppose in a cryptographic scheme, we use a hash function H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m which is fully
specified, for example SHAKE-256. In the random oracle model (ROM), we make the following
assumption: the function H can be modeled as a random function from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m to which
we only have a black box access. In the quantum random oracle model (QROM), we allow a
quantum black box access to the function H, meaning that we give access to the unitary
UH : |x〉|y〉 → |x〉|y ⊕H(x)〉.
3.4 Quantum lower bounds
We will use a generalization of Grover’s lower bound for the search problem.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be respectively an input set and an output set. For each x ∈ X, we
associate a set Ux ⊆ Y such that
|Ux|
|Y | ≤ ε. For any quantum query algorithm A with |A | = (∗, q),
we have
Pr[H(x) ∈ Ux : H
$
←− FXY , x← A
|H〉(·)] ≤ O(q2ε).
The above lemma was implicitly stated and proven in [Unr17, Theorem21]. Another lower
bound that we will use is Zhandry’s quantum lower bound on distinguishing a random permutation
from a random function with small range [Zha15]. We fix a set X, an integer r such that [r] ⊆ X,
and define the following distribution DSFXr on functions in F
X
X , which can be sampled as follows:
• Draw a random function g
$
←− FX[r].
• Draw a random injective function h from [r] to X.
• Output h ◦ g.
Notice that since we imposed [r] ⊆ X, we can consider g as an element of FXX and choose for h a
random permutation in PX which will lead to the same distribution. Also, we can replace [r] with
any other set Y ⊆ X with |Y | = r. Zhandry’s lower bound can be stated as follows:
Proposition 3 ([Zha15]). ∆q(DSF
X
r ,P
X) ≤ O( q
3
r ).
9
4 Identification schemes
4.1 First definitions
An identification scheme IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R), consists of the following:
• A key generation algorithm KIS(1
λ)→ (pk, sk).
• The prover’s algorithm PIS = (P1, P2) for constructing his messages. We have P1(sk) →
(x, St) where x ∈M corresponds to the first message and St is some internal state. P2(sk, x, c, St)→
z where c ∈ C is the challenge from the verifier and z ∈ R the prover’s response (second mes-
sage).
• A verification function VIS(pk, x, c, z) used by the verifier that outputs a bit, 0 corresponds
to ‘Reject’ and 1 to ‘Accept’.
Notice that we specify in the description of IS the sets M,C,R corresponding respectively to
the first message space, the challenge space and the second message (i.e. response) space. All
the different algorithms presented above are efficient and we will usually omit their running times
(i.e. fix them to 1), in order to reduce the amount of notations we introduce. Even though we
deal with concrete security parameters in this paper, we keep the notation KIS(1
λ) with a unary
representation of a security parameter λ to remind this implicit efficiency requirement.
We present below more precisely the different steps of an identification scheme.
Identification scheme IS = (KIS , PIS = (P1, P2), VIS ;M,C,R)
Initialization. (pk, sk) ← KIS(1
λ). The prover has (pk, sk) and the verifier
pk.
Interaction.
1. The prover generates (x, St)← P1(sk) and sends x ∈M to the verifier.
2. The verifier picks c
$
←− C and sends c to the prover.
3. The prover generates z ← P2(sk, x, c, St) and sends z ∈ R to the verifier.
Verification. The verifier accepts iff. VIS(pk, x, c, z) = 1.
We denote by IS⊗r the r-fold parallel repetition of IS, which consists of the following
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Identification scheme IS⊗r when IS = (KIS , PIS = (P1, P2), VIS ;M,C,R)
Initialization. (pk, sk)← KIS(1
λ). The prover P has (pk, sk) and the verifier
V has pk.
Interaction.
1. P generates (x1, St1), . . . , (xr, Str) where for each i ∈ [r], he generates
(xi, Sti)← P1(sk). He then sends x = x
1, . . . , xr to V .
2. V picks a random c = c1, . . . , cr where each ci
$
←− C and sends c to P .
3. P generates z = (z1, . . . , zr) where for each i ∈ [r], zi ← P2(sk, x
i, ci, Sti)
and sends z to V .
Verification. The verifier V accepts iff. ∀i ∈ [r], VIS(pk, x
i, ci, zi) = 1.
Now, let’s present the properties we want an identification scheme to verify. The first property
we want from an identification scheme is that the verifier accepts if a prover runs the scheme
honestly.
Definition 1 (Completeness). An identification scheme IS = (KIS , PIS = (P1, P2), VIS ;M,C,R)
has perfect completeness if
Pr

VIS(pk, x, c, z) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(pk,sk)←KIS(1
λ)
(x,St)←P1(sk)
c
$
←−C
z←P2(sk,x,c,St)=1

 = 1.
We only consider here perfect completeness but almost perfect completeness where the proba-
bility above is very close to 1 could also be used.
The second property we want is honest-verifier zero-knowledge, meaning that an honest verifier
cannot extract any information (in particular about the secret key sk), from its interaction with
an honest prover.
Definition 2 (HVZK). An identification scheme IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R) is ε-HVZK if
there exists an efficient simulator Sim such that the 2 distributions D1 and D2 sampled as follows:
• D1 : (pk, sk)← KIS(1
λ), (x, St)← P1(sk), c
$
←− C, z ← P2(sk, x, c, St), return (x, c, z),
• D2 : (pk, sk)← KIS(1
λ), (x′, c′, z′)← Sim(pk, 1λ), return (x′, c′, z′),
have statistical distance10 at most ε.
Finally, the third property that we require is soundness. We don’t want an efficient cheating
prover that doesn’t know the secret key sk to make the verifier accept. There are different notions
of soundness and the interplay between them will play an important role in our proofs.
Different flavors of soundness. We provide here notions of soundness in terms of advantage,
which are well suited when dealing with concrete security bounds. We first define the notion of
(computational) soundness advantage for a quantum cheating adversary A .
10The statistical distance between 2 distributions is defined as ∆(D1, D2)
△
= 1
2
∑
y |Prx←D1 [x = y]−Prx←D2 [x = y]|.
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Definition 3 (Quantum soundness advantage). Let IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R) be an iden-
tification scheme. For any quantum algorithm (a quantum cheating prover) A = (A1,A2), we
define
QADVIS(A )
△
=Pr

VIS(pk, x, c, z) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(pk,sk)←KIS(1
λ)
(x,St)←A1(pk)
c
$
←−C
z←A2(pk,x,c,St)


and QADVIS(t)
△
=maxA =(A1,A2),
|A1|+|A2|=t
(QADVIS(A )) .
In the context of identification schemes, we define the quantum 2-special soundness advantage
as follows
Definition 4. Let IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R) be an identification scheme. For any quantum
algorithm A , we define
QADV 2-spIS (A )
△
=Pr
[
VIS(pk, x, c, z) = 1 ∧ VIS(pk, x, c
′, z′) = 1 ∧ c 6= c′
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)(x,c,z,c′,z′)←A (pk)]
and QADV 2-spIS (t)
△
=maxA :|A |=t
(
QADV 2-spIS (A )
)
.
A small 2-special soundness advantage means that it is hard for a quantum adversary to con-
struct 2 valid transcripts (x, c, z) and (x, c′, z′) with c 6= c′. This notion can be extended to γ-special
soundness, where we require more than 2 transcripts.
Definition 5. Let IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R) be an identification scheme. For any quantum
algorithm A , we define
QADV γ-spIS (A ) = Pr
[
∀j ∈ [γ], VIS(pk, x, cj , zj)
△
=1 ∧
(c1, . . . , cγ are pairwise distinct)
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)(x,c1,...,cγ ,z1,...,zγ)←A (pk)
]
and QADV γ-spIS (t)
△
=maxA :|A |=t
(
QADV γ-spIS (A )
)
.
4.2 The Fiat-Shamir transform for identification schemes
The Fiat-Shamir transform [FS86] is a major cryptographic construction that converts any Σ-
protocol, in our case any identification scheme into an non-interactive protocol. The idea is to
use a hash function H : M → C, and to replace the verifier’s challenge c ∈ C by the string H(x)
where x is the prover’s first message. Since the prover can compute H(x) himself, there is no need
for interaction anymore. For any identification scheme IS, we denote by FSH[IS] its Fiat-Shamir
transform, for a fixed function H.
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Running FSH[IS] for an identification scheme IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R)
Initialization. (pk, sk)← KIS(1
λ). The prover P has (pk, sk) and the verifier
V has pk.
One-way communication. P generates (x, St) ← P1(sk), computes c =
H(x) and generates z ← P2(sk, x, c, St). He sends the pair (x, z) to the verifier.
Verification. The verifier accepts iff. VIS(pk, x,H(x), z) = 1.
The Fiat-Shamir transform is very useful as it can be used (among other things) to construct
signature schemes from identification schemes. The quantum Fiat-Shamir advantage for FSH[IS]
is defined as follows:
Definition 6. Let IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R) be an identification scheme and FS
H[IS] its
Fiat-Shamir transform. Let A be a quantum query algorithm. We define
QADVFSH[IS](A
|H〉)
△
=Pr
[
V (x,H(x), z) = 1
∣∣∣(pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)
(x,z)←A |H〉(pk)
]
and QADVFSH[IS](t, qH)
△
=maxA :|A |=(t,qH)
(
QADVFSH[IS](A
|H〉)
)
.
In the QROM, this function H is modeled as a random function to which we only have black
box access. In this model, the quantum Fiat-Shamir advantage that we are interested in is
E
H
$
←−FMC
(
QADVFSH[IS](A
|H〉)
)
.
4.3 Signature schemes
All our technical work is on identification scheme but the finality is to prove the security of signature
schemes. We discuss signature schemes and how the security of identification schemes implies the
security of signature schemes in Appendix A.
4.4 Relating the quantum Fiat-Shamir security to rigid soundness
In this section, we introduce the notion of rigid soundness and to relate the quantum Fiat-Shamir
security of any identification scheme to this notion. Throughout this section, we fix an identification
scheme IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS ;M,C,R). We first define the set V C
IS
x of valid challenges for x ∈M
as well as the set V CIS≥γ of elements having at least γ valid challenges for any γ ∈ N:
V CISx
△
={c ∈ C : ∃z ∈ R,VIS(pk, x, c, z) = 1} ; V C
IS
≥γ
△
={x ∈M : |V CISx | ≥ γ}.
We can now define the quantum γ-rigid soundness advantage for a quantum algorithm A as follows:
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Definition 7 (Quantum γ-rigid soundness advantage).
QADV γ-rsIS (A )
△
=Pr
[
x ∈ V CISγ
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)x←A (pk) ] ; QADV γ-rsIS (t) △= max
A :|A |=t
QADV γ-rsIS (A ).
We now relate the security of the Fiat-Shamir transform to a rigid soundness advantage.
Proposition 4. For any query algorithm A |H〉 with |A |H〉| = (t, qH), for any integer γ ≥ 2, we
have
EH←FMC
[
QADVFSH[IS](A
|H〉)
]
≤ QADV γ-rsIS (t, qH) +O(
q2Hγ
|C|
).
Proof. Fix a query algorithm A |H〉 with |A |H〉| = (t, qH) and an integer γ ≥ 2.
EH←FMC
[QADVFSH[IS](A
|H〉)] = Pr
H←FMC
[
VIS(pk, x,H(x), z) = 1
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)
(x,z)←A |H〉(pk)
]
= P1 + P2 (4)
with P1
△
= Pr
H←FMC
[
VIS(pk, x,H(x), z) = 1 ∧ (x ∈ V C
IS
≥γ )
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)
(x,z)←A |H〉(pk)
]
P2
△
= Pr
H←FMC
[
VIS(pk, x,H(x), z) = 1 ∧ (x /∈ V C
IS
≥γ )
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)
(x,z)←A |H〉(pk)
]
.
A |H〉 runs in time t so the probability that it outputs x ∈ V CIS≥γ is upper bounded by QADV
γ-rs
IS (t)
hence P1 ≤ QADV
γ-rs
IS (t). If x /∈ V C
IS
≥γ then |V C
IS
x | ≤ γ − 1. Moreover, if VIS(pk, x,H(x), z) = 1
then H(x) ∈ V CISx . Hence:
P2 ≤ Pr
H←FM
n
C
[
H(x) ∈ V CISx ∧
(
|V CISx | ≤ (γ − 1)
) ∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)
(x,z)←A |H〉(pk)
]
.
We can directly use Lemma 1 with Ux = |V C
IS
x | and the fact that A
|H〉 perform qH queries
to |H〉 to obtain P2 ≤ O(
q2H(γ−1)
|C| ) = O(
q2Hγ
|C| ). Putting the bounds on P1 and P2 in Equation 4, we
obtain the desired result.
This proposition can be seen as a generalization of Unruh’s relation between the Fiat-Shamir
security and a statistical soundness advantage, but we replace this statistical soundness with rigid
soundness. While some schemes may naturally have the rigid soundness property, it is not a priori
clear how to use Proposition 4. As we will see, this Proposition will be very useful when studying
commit-and-open identification schemes, which we now define and discuss.
4.5 Commit and open identification schemes
A commit-and-open identification scheme is a specific kind of identification scheme where, for the
first message, P commits to some values z1, . . . , zn using some function G and after the verifier’s
challenge, he reveals a subset of those values. More precisely, a commit-and-open identification
scheme IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) consists of the following
• A key generation algorithm KIS(1
λ)→ (pk, sk).
• A function G : R→M that will act as a commitment scheme.
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• The challenge set C where each c ∈ C has a corresponding set Ic ⊆ [n].
• The prover’s algorithm PIS = (P1, P2) for constructing his messages. We have P1(sk)→ (x, z)
where z = (z1, . . . , zn) with each zi ∈ R and x = x1, . . . , xn = G(z1), . . . , G(zn) with each
xi ∈M. P2(z, c) outputs zIc = {zi}i∈Ic .
• A verification function VIS(pk, c, zIc). The verifier also checks that the commitments are
valid, i.e. for each i ∈ Ic, G(zi) = xi.
Notice that we now denote by M the message space of individual commited values, so the Prover
sends actually an element in Mn. Notice also that in the above verification function, we require
VIS to be independent of x, and we check the validity of the commitment separately. All the real
identification schemes we will consider have this property.
Commit-and-open Identification scheme IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n)
Initialization. (pk, sk) ← KIS(1
λ). The prover has (pk, sk) and the verifier
pk.
Interaction.
1. P generates (z1, . . . , zn, G(z1), . . . , G(zn)) ← P1(sk) and sends
x1, . . . , xn = G(z1), . . . , G(zn) to the verifier.
2. The verifier sends a random c
$
←− C that corresponds to a subset Ic ⊆ [n].
3. P sends zIc to the verifier.
Verification. The verifier accepts iff. (∀i ∈ Ic, G(zi) = xi)∧VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1.
The Quantum Random Oracle Model for commit-and-open identification schemes.
As we described in section 4.2, we use the QROM to characterize the quantum security of the
Fiat-Shamir transform of IS using the quantity
E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSH[IS](t, qH)
]
.
We will use again the QROM for the commitment function, and model the function G as
a random function in FRM . We will write ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) to specify the
commitment function used in the subscript of IS. The quantum Fiat-Shamir advantage therefore
becomes
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
,
where qG is the number of queries to the unitary UG.
For commit-and-open identification schemes, we define 2 variants of γ-special soundness. These
variants have the nice property that they are independent of the commitment function used, which
is not the case for special soundness. We first define output special soundness
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Definition 8. Let ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification scheme.
For any quantum query algorithm A , we define
QADV γ-ospISG (A )
△
=Pr[|{c : VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1}| ≥ γ : (pk, sk)← KIS(1
λ), z ← A (pk)
]
.
where z = (z1, . . . , zn). We also define QADV
γ-osp
ISG
(t)
△
=maxA :|A |=t
(
QADV γ-ospISG (A )
)
The idea of output special soundness is that we can generate z (and x = G(z1, . . . , zn) such
that there exist γ valid triplets (x, c1, zI1), . . . , (x, cγ , zIγ ) for pairwise distinct challenges c1, . . . , cγ .
However, the adversary here doesn’t need to output these challenges. This notion is incomparable
with γ-special soundness.
The second notion is the γ-special+ soundness which is the same as above but the adversary
has to output the challenges.
Definition 9. Let ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification scheme.
For any quantum query algorithm A , we define
QADV γ-sp+ISG (A )
△
=Pr
[ (
∀i ∈ [γ], VIS(pk, ci, zIci ) = 1
)
∧ the ci are pairwise distinct :
(pk, sk)← KIS(1
λ), (z, c1, . . . , cγ)← A (pk)
]
.
where z = (z1, . . . , zn). We also define QADV
γ-sp+
ISG
(t)
△
=maxA :|A |=t
(
QADV γ-sp+ISG (A )
)
This definition is also independent of the commitment used in IS. As the name suggests,
this notion is stronger than γ-special soundness in the sense that QADV γ-sp+ISG (t) ≤ QADV
γ-sp
ISG
(t).
This comes from the from an adversary a generating (z, c1, . . . , cγ) that breaks the γ-special+
soundness property, we can construct explicitly γ valid triplets (x, c1, zI1), . . . , (x, cγ , zIγ ) with x =
(G(z1), . . . , G(zn)) and the challenges are pairwise distinct, which breaks the γ-special soundness
property.
We are now ready to jump in the proofs of our theorems.
5 The quantum Fiat-Shamir security of commit-and-open identi-
fication schemes
5.1 Overview of our theorems and proof strategy
Our main theorems are the following:
Theorem 1. Let ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification scheme
with G
$
←− FRM . Let also γ ≥ 2 be an integer. We have for any t, qH, qG :
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[IS⊗rG ]
(t, qH, qG)
]
≤ QADV γ-sp+ISG
(
t′, qH
)
+O
(
q2H(γ − 1)
r
|C|r
)
+On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)
.
with t′ = On(t) + nr + n|C|.
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One can then use QADV γ-sp+ISG (t
′, qH) ≤ QADV
γ-sp
ISG
(t′, qH) in order to get a bound in terms of
γ-special soundness.
Theorem 2. Let ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification scheme
with G
$
←− FRM . Let also γ ≥ 2 be an integer. We have for any t, qH, qG :
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
≤ QADV γ-ospISG (On(t), qH) +O
(
q2Hγ
|C|
)
+On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)
.
Proof strategy. We present here informally our proof strategy. We fix a commit-and-open iden-
tification scheme ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) and a quantum algorithm A that wants to
break the quantum soundness of FSH[ISG]. This algorithm outputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) and zIc such
that if we define c
△
=H(x), we have VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1∧∀i ∈ Ic, G(zi) = xi. IfG were an easily invert-
ible permutation, we could from x = (x1, . . . , xn) extract the full string z = (G
−1(x1), . . . , G
−1(xn)).
With such a construction, we can fairly directly relate γ-rigid soundness and γ-output special
soundness and then conclude using Proposition 4. However, G is not usually an efficiently invert-
ible random permutation and it can’t be if IS has to be honest verifier zero-knowledge. In order
to circumvent this issue, we perform the 4 following steps:
1. We transform IS into I˜S in order to artificially increase the size of R. This will allow
us to work with larger functions with which we will be able to construct pseudorandom
permutations using Feistel networks.
2. We start from G
$
←− FRM as our commitment and show that we can replace G with a random
permutation σ ∈ PR.
3. We now have a random permutation σ as our commitment. We show here how to replace σ
with a quantum pseudorandom permutation pi0 that is easily invertible using Feistel networks.
4. Now, that we have an easily invertible permutation, we relate the quantum Fiat-Shamir
advantage to the special+ (or output special) soundness advantage of I˜S. We can then go
back to IS since the two soundness advantage notions we consider are independent of the
commitment used and are the same for IS and I˜S, which allows us to finish the proof. It is
only step 4 that differes for Theorems 1 and 2.
We now present these 4 steps in the next 4 subsections.
5.2 Step 1: Transforming IS into I˜S
We start from a commit-and-open identification ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n). We consider
the smallest set R′ of the form {0, 1}2m with m ≥ 2048 such that R ⊆ R′ and M ⊆ R′11. With
this artificial increase of R, we consider a commitment function G′ : R′ → M . The idea is that
instead of committing to each zi ∈ R using the string G(zi), we commit to these strings via the
string G′(zi||0 . . . 0), where zi||0 . . . 0 ∈ R
′.
11To do this, we increase m so that |M |, |R| ≤ 22m. If this doesn’t give us the inclusions then we can relabel the
elements of M and R so that they are included in {0, 1}2m.
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We consider I˜SG′ = (KIS , PIS , V˜IS , G
′;M,C,R′, n) that is derived from ISG where we changed
the space R into R′ (and accordingly the function G into G′), as well as V˜IS which is defined as
follows:
V˜IS(pk, c, z
′
Ic) = 1⇔
(
∀i ∈ Ic, z
′
i = zi||0 . . . 0 for some zi ∈ R
)
∧ VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1.
We prove the following proposition
Proposition 5. For any hash function H, for any t, qG, qH, we have
E
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
≤ E
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADV
FSH[I˜SG′ ]
(t, qH, qG)
]
.
Proof. For any functionG′ ∈ FR
′
M , we define the function CG′ ∈ F
R
M as follows: CG′(z)
△
=G′(z||0 . . . 0).
Notice that if G′ is a random function in FR
′
M then CG′ is a random function in F
R
M . Therefore
E
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](A
|G〉,|H〉)
]
= E
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADVFSH[ISC
G′
](A
|CG′ 〉,|H〉)
]
.
Now, let’s consider the following algorithm A
|CG′ 〉,|H〉
2 : (x, zIc)← A
|CG′〉,|H〉 with c = H(x). Return
(x, z′Ic) where ∀i ∈ Ic, z
′
i = zi||0 . . . 0. From the definition of I˜S, we have
E
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADVFSH[ISC
G′
](A
|CG′ 〉,|H〉)
]
= E
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADV
FSH[I˜SG′ ]
(A
|CG′ 〉,|H〉
2 )
]
≤ E
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADV
FSH[I˜SG′ ]
(A
|G′〉,|H〉
2 )
]
where the last inequality comes from the fact that a call to UCG′ can be done with a call to UG′ .
Since the running time and number of queries remains unchanged between A and A2, we can
conclude.
Notice also from the definitions that we can derive the following equalities, for any γ and H:
E
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADV γ-sp+ISG (t, qG, qH)
]
= E
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADV γ-sp+
I˜SG′
(t, qG, qH)
]
E
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADV γ-ospISG (t, qG, qH)
]
= E
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADV γ-osp
I˜SG′
(t, qG, qH)
]
5.3 Step 2: Replacing G with a random permutation
We prove the second step, which corresponds to the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification
scheme with M ⊆ R. We have for any t, qH, qG
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
≤ E
H
$
←−FMnC
σ
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISσ](t
′′, q′′H, q
′′
G) +On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)]
.
with t′′ = On(t), q
′′
H = qH, q
′′
G = On(qG + qH).
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Proof. We first show the following lemma, which states that we can replace G with pi ◦ G for any
permutation pi ∈ PR. In order to define pi ◦ G, we actually need to extend G to a function with
image R, which is possible since we considered the case where M ⊆ R.
Lemma 2. For any permutation pi ∈ PR, for which we have an efficient black box access, for any
fixed G ∈ FRM (extended to G ∈ F
R
R ), there exists a quantum query algorithm B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉 of size
|B|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉|
△
=(t′, q′H, q
′
G, q
′
pi) such that
E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
= E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉)
]
.
and t′ = On(t), q
′
H = qH, q
′
G = qG, q
′
pi = On(qH).
Proof. Let A |H〉,|G〉 be a quantum query algorithm with |A |H〉,|G〉| = (t, qH, qG) andQADVFSH[ISG](A
|H〉,|G〉) =
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG). Fix also a permutation pi. For each function H : M
n → C, we define
Hpi(x1, . . . , xn)
△
=H(pi(x1), . . . , pi(xn)). Notice that if H
$
←− FM
n
C then Hpi is also uniformly random
in FM
n
C for any fixed pi. Therefore, we have
E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSH[ISG](A
|H〉,|G〉)
]
= E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSHpi [ISG](A
|Hpi〉,|G〉)
]
. (5)
We now construct the following algorithm B|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉 : (x, zIc) ← A
|Hpi〉,|G〉, return (pi(x), zIc).
where we use the notation pi(x) = pi(x1), . . . , pi(xn). The algorithm B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉 emulates calls to
UHpi , with calls to UH and Upi, using each time n calls to Upi and 1 call to UH.
Γ1
△
=QADVFSHpi [ISpi◦G](A
|Hpi〉,|G〉)
= Pr
[
VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1 ∧ (∀i ∈ Ic, G(zi) = xi)
∣∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)(x,zIc)←A |Hpi〉,|G〉
c=Hpi(x)
]
= Pr
[
VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1 ∧ (∀i ∈ Ic, (pi ◦G)(zi) = pi(xi))
∣∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)(x,zIc)←A |Hpi〉,|G〉
c=H(pi(x))
]
= Pr
[
VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1 ∧ (∀i ∈ Ic, (pi ◦G)(zi) = pi(xi))
∣∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)(pi(x),zIc )←B|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉
c=H(pi(x))
]
= QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉). (6)
Combining Equations 5 and 6, we can conclude
E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSH[ISG](A
|H〉,|G〉)
]
= E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSHpi [ISG](A
|Hpi〉,|G〉)
]
= E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉)
]
.
We now go back to the proof of Proposition 6. The above lemma holds for any pi and G, so we
can choose in particular a random function G and random permutation pi, which gives us
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
= E
H
$
←−FMnC
E
G
$
←−FRM
pi
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉)
]
. (7)
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Using Zhandry’s lower bound on small range functions, it seems we could directly conclude and
get Proposition 6. There is a caveat though. The algorithm B constructed in the above lemma
makes calls to UH, UG and Upi while in order to satisfy the definitions, we would want B to make
calls only to UH and Upi◦G.
In order to solve the problem, we use once again the QROM. In the scheme ISpi◦G, when taking
random pi and G, the commitment used pi ◦ G is a random function with small range and we use
the QROM to state that we only have black box access to pi ◦ G. This implies that an adversary
having access to UG and Upi isn’t more powerful than an adversary having access to Upi◦G when
trying to attack the Fiat-Shamir transform of ISpi◦G in the QROM and motivates the following:
Assumption 1 (The QROM assumption for ISpi◦G).
12 For any quantum query algorithm B|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉
with |B|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉| = (t, q′H, q
′
G, q
′
pi), there exists an algorithm C
|H〉,|pi◦G〉 st.
E
G
$
←−FRM
pi
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉)
]
= E
G
$
←−FRM
pi
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](C
|H〉,|pi◦G〉)
]
.
and |C |H〉,|pi◦G〉| = (t′, q′H, q
′
G + q
′
pi).
Here, we count conservatively and consider that a call to UG or Upi in B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉 is as powerful
as a call to Upi◦G in C
|H〉,|pi◦G〉. Also, the above is true for any function H.
We can now go finish the proof of Proposition 7. Fix any algorithm B|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉 with |B|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉| =
(t′, q′H, q
′
G, q
′
pi) and a corresponding C
|H〉,|pi◦G〉 such that the equality of Assumption 1 holds. Recall
the definition of DSF of Section 3.4. We get for any H
E
G
$
←−FRM
pi
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉)
]
= E
G
$
←−FRM
pi
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](C
|H〉,|pi◦G〉)
]
= ES←DSFR
|M|
[
QADVFSH[ISS ](C
|H〉,|S〉)
]
≤ ES←DSFR
|M|
[
QADVFSH[ISS ](t
′, q′H, q
′
G + q
′
pi)
]
(8)
We now use Proposition 3 to get for any H:
ES←DSFR
|M|
[
QADVFSH[ISS ](t
′, q′H, q
′
G + q
′
pi)
]
≤ E
σ
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISσ ](t, q
′
H, q
′
G + q
′
pi)
]
+
O
(
(q′G + q
′
pi)
3
|M |
)
. (9)
12The function pi ◦G has less structure for a random pi and random G than say the SHA-3 sponge with a random
internal function. In the QROM, the latter is modeled in a black box fashion, so we consider as a mild assumption
to also consider this for the former.
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Putting Equations 7, 8 and 9, we get
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
= E
H
$
←−FMnC
E
G
$
←−FRM
pi
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISpi◦G](B
|H〉,|G〉,|pi〉)
]
≤ E
H
$
←−FMnC
E
S
$
←−DSFR
|M|
[
QADVFSH[ISS ](t
′, q′H, q
′
G + q
′
pi)
]
≤ E
H
$
←−FMnC
σ
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISσ ](t
′, q′H, q
′
G + q
′
pi)
]
+O
(
(q′G + q
′
pi)
3
|M |
)
≤ E
H
$
←−FMnC
σ
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISσ ](t
′′, q′′H, q
′′
G)
]
+On
(
(qH + qG)
3
|M |
)
with t′′ = On(t), q
′′
H = qH, q
′′
G = On(qG + qH) where for the last inequality, we use t
′ = On(t), q
′
H =
qH, q
′
G = qG, q
′
pi = On(qH).
5.4 Step 3: Replacing the random permutation σ with an efficiently invertible
QPRP
We prove the following proposition
Proposition 7. Let IS = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification
scheme with R = {0, 1}2m for some integer m. In the QROM, there exists a permutation pi0
that is efficiently computable and invertible such that for any fixed H:
E
σ
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISσ ](t, qH, qG)
]
≤ QADVFSH[ISp˜i0 ]
(t, qH) +O(
q3G
2m/2
).
Proof. In order to prove this proposition, we will use Feistel networks described in Section 3. Our
pseudorandom permutation is the following
pi0
△
=Fe4(SHAKE-256{0,1}m,{0,1}m).
Now fix H. We have
E
σ
$
←−PR
[
QADVFSH[ISσ ](t, qH, qG)
]
≤ E
f
$
←−F{0,1}
m
{0,1}m
[
QADVFSH[ISFe4(f)]
(t, qH, qG)
]
+O(
√
q6G
2m
)
= QADVFSH[ISp˜i0 ]
(t, qH) +O(
q3G
2m/2
).
The first inequality comes from Proposition 2 and the second equality comes from the QROM,
where we model the hash function SHAKE-256{0,1}m,{0,1}m with a random function in F
{0,1}m
{0,1}m .
When m ≥ 2048 (this is the value chosen in Step 1 but it couldn’t have been another arbitrary
large value), the term O(
q3G
2m/2
) will always be tiny and irrelevant for the amounts of security we
consider.
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5.5 Finishing the proof: step 4 and conclusion
So we managed to replace the commitment function by the pseudorandom permutation pi0 =
Fe4(SHAKE-256{0,1}m,{0,1}m) with |R| = 2
2m. As we described in Section 3, this use of Feis-
tel networks implies that both pi0 and pi
−1
0 are efficiently computable without needing to know
how to compute preimages for SHAKE-256{0,1}m,{0,1}m . Our goal in this final step is to bound
QADVFSH[ISp˜i0 ]
(t, qH).
5.5.1 Step 4 used for Theorem 2
Proposition 8. Let ISpi0 = (KIS , PIS , VIS , pi0;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification
scheme. For any integer γ ≥ 2, for any fixed H, we have
QADVFSH[ISp˜i0 ]
(t, qH) ≤ QADV
γ-osp
ISp˜i0
(t+ n, qH) +O(
q2Hγ
|C|
).
Notice here that since pi0 has a known efficient description, we don’t consider only black box calls
to Upi0 but we can perform any computation that depends on the description of pi0 and pi
−1
0 . Also,
the above holds for any efficiently computable and invertible permutation pi0.
Proof. Fix a commit-and-open identification scheme ISp˜i0 = (KIS , PIS , VIS , pi0;M,C,R, n), and
an integer γ ≥ 2. Using Proposition 4, we have
QADVFSH[ISp˜i0 ]
(t, qH) ≤ QADV
γ-rs
ISp˜i0
(t, qH) +O(
q2Hγ
|C|
). (10)
Let C |H〉 be an quantum query algorithm satisfying |C |H〉| = (t, qH) and QADV
γ-rs
ISp˜i0
(t, qH) =
QADV γ-rsISp˜i0
(C |H〉). We consider the following algorithm B|H〉:
B
|H〉(pk) : x
△
=(x1, . . . , xn)← C
|H〉(pk), z = (pi−10 (x1), . . . , pi
−1
0 (xn)), return z.
Notice that if C |H〉 outputs a value x ∈ V CIS≥γ , then |{c : VIS(pk, c, zIc) = 1}| ≥ γ). Therefore,
QADV γ-rsISp˜i0
(C |H〉) ≤ QADV γ-ospISp˜i0
(B|H〉). Also B|H〉 runs in time t + n (recall that pi−10 can be
performed efficiently so we consider here its running time is 1). We can therefore conclude
QADV γ-rsISp˜i0
(t, qH) ≤ QADV
γ-osp
ISp˜i0
(t+ n, qH).
5.5.2 Theorem 2: putting everything together
We can now show our first main theorem, which is the combination of our 4 steps.
Theorem 2. Let ISG = (KIS , PIS , VIS , G;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification scheme
with G
$
←− FRM . Let also γ ≥ 2 be an integer. We have for any t, qH, qG :
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
≤ QADV γ-ospISG (On(t), qH) +O
(
q2Hγ
|C|
)
+On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)
.
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Proof. We start from ISG and construct I˜SG′ = (KIS , PIS , V˜IS , G
′;M,C,R′, n) as in Proposition
5. We have in particular M ⊆ R, which allows us to apply Proposition 6 and R = {0, 1}2m with
m ≥ 2048. We define pi0
△
=Fe4(SHAKE-256{0,1}m,{0,1}m) and write
Γ2
△
=E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[ISG](t, qH, qG)
]
≤ E
H
$
←−FMnC
G′
$
←−FR′M
[
QADV
FSH[I˜SG′ ]
(t, qG, qH)
]
≤ E
H
$
←−FMnC
σ
$
←−PR
[
QADV
FSH[I˜Sσ ]
(On(t), qH, On(qG + qH))
]
+On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)
= E
H
$
←−FMnC
[
QADV
FSH[I˜Sp˜i0 ]
(On(t), qH)
]
+On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)
≤ QADV γ-osp
I˜Sp˜i0
(On(t), qH) +O
(
q2Hγ
|C|
)
+On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)
= QADV γ-ospISG (On(t), qH) +O
(
q2Hγ
|C|
)
+On
(
(qG + qH)
3
|M |
)
The first 4 lines come from the 4 steps of our proof, namely Propositions 5, 6, 7 and 8. We ignored
the term On(
(qG+qH)
3
22m
) from Proposition 7 which is tiny and absorbed by the other terms for any
reasonable security requirement since m ≥ 2024. The last equality comes the last equalities of
Section 5.2. and concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
5.5.3 Step 4 used for Theorem 1
We prove here the Step 4 that will be used for proving Theorem 1.
Proposition 9. Let ISpi0 = (KIS , PIS , VIS , pi0;M,C,R, n) be a commit-and-open identification
scheme, where pi0 is an efficiently computable and invertible permutation. For any integer γ ≥ 2,
and r ∈ N∗, we have
QADVFSH[IS⊗r
p˜i0
](t, qH) ≤ QADV
γ-sp+
ISp˜i0
(t+ nr + |C|r, qH) +O
(
q2H(γ − 1)
r
|C|r
)
.
Proof. We first show the following 2 lemmata.
Lemma 3. Let S ⊆ |C|r. Let γ ≥ 2 be an integer. If |S| ≥ (γ − 1)r + 1 then there exists an index
i ∈ [r], |{ci : ∃c = (c1, . . . , cr), c ∈ S}| ≥ γ.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Let Ti
△
={ci : ∃c = (c1, . . . , cr), c ∈ S} and assume that
∀i ∈ [r], |Ti| ≤ γ − 1. We immediately have S ⊆ T1 × T2 · · · × Tr which implies |S| ≤ Πi∈r|Ti| ≤
(γ − 1)r.
For the next lemma, recall the definitions of valid challenges of Section 4.4. We wil now write
IS⊗r instead of IS⊗rpi0 to lighten the notations.
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Lemma 4. Let x = (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ Mnr where for each i ∈ [r], xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
n) and each
xij ∈ M. Let also γ ≥ 2 be an integer. If x ∈ V
IS⊗r
≥(γ−1)r+1 then there exists an i ∈ [r], dis-
tinct values b1, . . . , bγ ∈ C such that if we define z
i △= p˜i−10 (x
i) = (pi−10 (x
i
1), . . . , pi
−1
0 (x
i
n)), we have
∀j ∈ [γ], VIS(pk, bj , z
i
Ibj
) = 1.
Proof. Fix x ∈ Mnr and assume |V CIS
⊗r
x | ≥ (γ − 1)
r + 1. Using the previous lemma, let i ∈ [r]
be the index such that |{ci ∈ C : ∃c = (c1, . . . , cr) ∈ V C
IS⊗r
x }| ≥ γ and we denote by {b1, . . . , bγ}
any γ pairwise distinct values of this set. For each j ∈ [γ], let cj ∈ V CIS
⊗r
x such that c
j
i = bj .
Let z = p˜i−10 (x). This means for each i ∈ [r], z
i = p˜i−10 (x
i). Now ∀j ∈ [γ], because the strings
bi ∈ V C
IS⊗r
x , we have
∀j ∈ [γ], V ⊗rIS (x, c
j , zI
cj
) = 1 ⇒ ∀j ∈ [γ], VIS(pk, bj , z
i
Ibj
) = 1.
With these 2 lemmata, we can prove Proposition 9. First notice using Proposition 4 that
QADVFSH[IS⊗r
p˜i0
](t, qH) ≤ QADV
((γ−1)r+1)-rs
IS⊗r
p˜i0
(t, qH) +O
(
q2H
(γ − 1)r
|C|r
)
. (11)
Let A |H〉 be a quantum algorithm running with |A |H〉| = (t, qH) such thatQADV
((γ−1)r+1)-rs
IS⊗r
p˜i0
(A |H〉) =
QADV
((γ−1)r+1)-rs
IS⊗r
p˜i0
(t, qH). We consider the following algorithm B
|H〉:
Quantum algorithm B|H〉
1. compute x = x1, . . . , xr ← A |H〉(pk) where for each i ∈ [r], x
i =
xi1, . . . , x
i
n.
2. compute for each i ∈ [r], j ∈ [n] zij = pi
−1
0 (x
i
j). Similarly as above, we
define zi = zi1, . . . , z
i
n for each i ∈ [r].
3. Find i ∈ [r] and distinct values b1, . . . , bγ ∈ C such that for each j ∈
[γ], VIS(pk, bj , z
i
Ij
) = 1 if such values exist, else output ⊥. To do so, we
compute VIS(pk, b, z
i
Ib
) for each i ∈ [r] and b ∈ C.
4. Output (b1, . . . , bγ , z
i).
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Using Lemma 4, we have
QADV
((γ−1)r+1)-rs
IS⊗r
p˜i0
(A |H〉) = Pr
[
x ∈ V CIS(γ−1)r+1
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)
x←A |H〉(pk)
]
≤ Pr
[
∃i ∈ [r],∃ distinct b1, . . . , bγ ∈ C :
∀j ∈ [γ], VIS(pk, x
i, bj , (pi
−1
0 (x
i))Ibj ) = 1 |
(pk,sk)←KIS(1
λ)
x←A |H〉(pk)
]
= Pr
[
∀j ∈ [γ], VIS(pk, bj , z
i
Ij ) = 1
∣∣∣ (pk,sk)←KIS(1λ)
(b1,...,bγ ,zi)←B|H〉(pk)
]
= QADV γ-sp+ISp˜i0
(B|H〉) (12)
Now, let’s compute the running time of B|H〉. Step 1: takes time t. Step 2: makes nr calls to pi−10 ,
which is efficiently computable. Step 3: makes |C|r calls to VIS which is efficiently computable.
This is implies that the total running time of B is t + nr + |C|r. Moreover, B|H〉 makes as much
queries to |H〉 as A |H〉. Combining Equation 11 and 12, we conclude
QADVFSH[IS⊗r
p˜i0
](t, qH) ≤ QADV
γ-sp+
ISp˜i0
(t+ nr + |C|r, qH) +O
(
q2H(γ − 1)
r
|C|r
)
5.5.4 Finishing the proof of Theorem 1
We finish the proof exactly as we did for Theorem 2 in Section 5.5.2 except we replace Proposition
8 with Proposition 9.
6 Practical instantiations
We now present several application of our results, to present concrete security claims for different
identification schemes, from which we can derive claims for signatures schemes. We first present
Stern’s identification scheme and its security claim in full detail. The reason we do this is that
this identification is probably one of the oldest and has inspired many more identification schemes
which have a similar stricture, which we then briefly discuss.
6.1 Stern signature scheme
Notations for this section. Matrices are denoted with bold large letters, for eg. M and line
vectors will be denoted with bold small letters, for eg. v = (v1, . . . , vn). The Hamming weight | · |H
for binary vectors is defined as follows: |v|H = |{i : vi = 1}|.
Stern’s signature scheme is one of the first signature schemes based on a commit-and-open iden-
tification scheme. It is a post-quantum signature scheme based on the hardness of the syndrome
decoding problem, which is the canonical hard problem for code-based cryptography.
Problem 1 (Syndrome Decoding - SD(n, k,w)).
• Instance: a parity-check matrix H ∈ {0, 1}(n−k)×n of rank n− k, a syndrome s ∈ {0, 1}n−k,
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• Output: e ∈ Sw such that eH
⊺ = s where Sw
△
={e ∈ {0, 1}n : |e|H = w}.
We also define the syndrome decoding advantage:
Definition 10 (SD-advantage(n, k,w)). For any algorithm A , we define
AdvSD(n,k,w)(A )
△
=Pr
(
eH⊺ = s ∧ |e| = w
∣∣∣H $←− FR(n−k),n, s $←− {0, 1}n−k , e← A (H, s)) ,
where FR(n−k),n
△
={H ∈ {0, 1}(n−k)×n : H has rank (n − k)} is the set of full rank matrices in
{0, 1}(n−k),n. For any time t, we also define, AdvSD(n,k,w)(t)
△
=maxA :|A |=tAdv
SD
(n,k,w)(A ).
We can now describe Stern’s identification scheme
Stern’s single round Identification scheme
ISStern(λ,G) = (KIS , PIS = (P1, P2), VIS , G;M,C = {1, 2, 3}, R, n = 3).
Initialization. KIS(1
λ) : H
$
←− FR(n−k),n, e
$
←− Sw, s
△
= eH⊺ return pk =
(H, s), sk = e, where n, k,w depend on the security parameter λ.
Interaction. P1 : σ
$
←− P [n],y ← {0, 1}n. Let s′
△
=yH⊺. Let also z1
△
=(σ||s′) ;
z2
△
=σ(y) ; z3
△
=σ(y⊕e). Send (x1, x2, x3)
△
=(G(z1), G(z2), G(z3)) to the verifier.
V : c
$
←− {1, 2, 3}, send c to the prover.
P2 : send zc′ for the two values c
′ different from c.
Verification. VIS(1, (z2, z3)) = 1 iff. |z2 + z3|H = w.
VIS(2, (z1
△
=(σ, s′), z3)) = 1 iff. σ
−1(z3)H
⊺ = s⊕ s′.
VIS(3, (z1
△
=(σ, s′), z2)) = 1 iff. σ
−1(z2)H
⊺ = s′.
One can check completeness. Indeed, in the honest case:
1. |z2 + z3|H = |σ(y) + σ(y ⊕ e)|H = |σ(e)|H = w.
2. σ−1(σ(y ⊕ e))H⊺ = yH⊺ + eH⊺.
3. σ−1(σ(y))H⊺ = yH⊺.
Moreover, suppose one constructs a triplet z1 = (σ, s
′), z2, z3 that passes the 3 checks. We show
how to easily construct a vector e such that eH⊺ = s and |e|H = w. Indeed, consider the vector
e = σ−1(z2⊕z3). Using the second and third checks, we have eH
⊺ = σ−1(z2⊕z3)H
⊺ = s⊕s′⊕s′ = s.
Also, |e|H = |σ
−1(z2 ⊕ z3)|H = |z2 ⊕ z3|H = w. This means we immediately have
QADV 3-spISStern(λ,G)(t) = QAdv
SD
(n(λ),k(λ),w(λ))(t). (13)
The above equality is exactly the kind of relations we need in order to prove the quantum security
of the Fiat-Shamir transform of identifications schemes and hence of resulting signature schemes.
Using Theorem 1, we immediately have
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Proposition 10 (Quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform for the parallel repetition of
Stern’s identifications scheme).
E
H
$
←−FMnC
G
$
←−FRM
[
QADVFSH[IS⊗rStern(λ,G)]
(t, qH, qG)
]
≤ QAdvSD(n(λ),k(λ),w(λ))(O(t))+O
(
q2H2
r
3r
)
+O
(
q3G
|M |
)
.
6.2 Other schemes
The above analysis can be similarly applied to other parallel repetition of commit-and-open iden-
tification schemes with |C| = 3, n = 3 and for which the post-quantum computational problem can
be directly related to 3-special+ soundness as in Equation 13. Such schemes include the [KTX08]
identification scheme, the [SSH11] identification scheme and the PICNIC identification scheme
[CDG+17], for which we can have a similar statement as Proposition 10.
The 5 round schemes, such as MQDSS or the KKW variant of PICNIC seem to require more
work but the current techniques seem quite promising for proving tight security reductions for those
as well. There are also more complicated schemes that are commit-and-open but with more rounds
such as Pigroast/Legroast [BD20]. These multi-round protocols also have asymptotic quantum
reductions from the work of [DFM20] and we hope our techniques can be useful here for concrete
security. We leave this for future work.
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A Signature schemes
A signature scheme S consists of 3 algorithms (S.keygen,S.sign,S.verify):
• S.keygen(1λ) → (pk, sk) is the generation of the public key pk and the secret key sk from
the security parameter λ.
• S.sign(m, pk, sk)→ σm : generates the signature σm of a message m from m, pk, sk.
• S.verify(m,σ, pk) → {0, 1} verifies that σ is a valid signature of m using m,σ, pk. The
output 1 corresponds to a valid signature.
Correctness. A signature scheme is correct iff. when we sample (pk, sk) ← S.keygen(1λ), we
have for each m
S.verify(m,S.sign(m, pk, sk), pk) = 1.
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Security definitions We consider the standard EUF-CMA security for signature schemes. To
define the advantage of an adversary A , we consider the following interaction with a challenger:
Initialize. The challenger generates (pk, sk)← S.keygen(1λ) and sends pk to A .
Query phase. A can perform sign queries by sending each time a message m to the challenger
who generates σ = S.sign(m, pk, sk) and sends σ to A . Let m1, . . . ,mqS the (not necessarily
distinct) queries made by A . The adversary can also make qH queries to H.
Output. A outputs a pair (m∗, σ∗). The advantage Adv(A ) for A is the quantity
QADV EUF-CMAS (A ) = Pr[A outputs (m
∗, σ∗) st.
S.verify(m∗, σ∗, pk) = 1 ∧m∗ 6= m1, . . . ,mqS ],
where m∗ 6= m1, . . . ,mqS means ∀i, m
∗ 6= mi.
Definition 11. Let S = (S.keygen,S.sign,S.verify) be a signature scheme. We define
QADV EUF-CMAS (t, qH, qS) = max
A
QADV EUF-CMAS (A ).
where we maximize over an adversary running in time t, performing qH hash queries and qS sign
queries.
We can directly construct a signature scheme from an identification scheme via the Fiat-Shamir
transform. From an identification scheme IS = (KIS , PIS = (P1, P2), VIS ;M,C,R), we define the
following signature scheme
SIS = (SIS .keygen,SIS .sign,SIS .verify) that uses a random function H:
• SIS .keygen(1
λ) = KIS(1
λ)
• SIS .sign(m, pk, sk) : (x, St)← P1(pk), c←H(x,m), z ← P2(sk, x, c, St), output σ = (x, z).
• SIS .verify(m,σ = (x, z), pk) = V (pk, x,H(x,m), z).
Proposition 11. [KLS18] Let IS be an identification scheme which is ε-HVZK and has α bits of
min-entropy. Let SIS the corresponding signature scheme.
QADV EUF-CMASIS (t, qH, qS) ≤ QADVFSH[IS](t+ qH + qS , qH) + qS2
−α + qSε.
where we need to average the 2 advantages over the hash function H.
The min-entropy here is the min-entropy of the prover’s first message when he in honest. All
schemes we consider will have very large min-entropy so the qS2
−α will be negligibly small. Notice
that in [KLS18], they prove a more general result where the identification scheme IS allows some
aborts. The above proposition shows that we only need to focus on the soundness of the Fiat-Shamir
transform in order to build signature schemes, which is what we will do in the paper.
30
